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ARBITRATION WITHOUT LAW:  CHOICE OF 
LAW IN FRAND DISPUTES 
Eli Greenbaum* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent arbitration between InterDigital and Huawei seems to 
demonstrate the purported advantages of arbitration as a means of dispute 
resolution.1  The warring parties subsumed their multiple suits across 
different jurisdictions and forums into a single binding arbitral process.  By 
virtue of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards2 (“the New York Convention”), the arbitral award would 
be enforceable across jurisdictions.  But even an agreement to arbitrate 
requires agreement on certain basic matters.  On the most fundamental 
level, it requires agreement on the substantive and procedural laws 
governing the dispute, as well as the situs—or location—of the arbitration.3  
The InterDigital arbitration shows the unfortunate difficulty of bridging 
even these basic gaps, and the recent Southern District of New York 
decision in InterDigital Communications, Inc. v. Huawei Investment & 
Holding Co.,4 concerning the arbitral award, may make such agreement 
even harder.  At the same time, however, InterDigital provides unexpected 
insight into when proceeding without such agreement can facilitate dispute 
resolution.  An agreement on substantive law may not necessarily provide 
legal clarity, and arbitrating parties should weigh the difficulty of obtaining 
consensus on such basic matters against the certainty that substantive law 
can, in practice, bring to the arbitration. 
 
*  Partner, Yigal Arnon & Co., Jerusalem, Israel.  J.D., Yale Law School; M.S., Columbia 
University. 
 
 1. See InterDigital Commc’ns, Inc. v. Huawei Inv. & Holding Co., 166 F. Supp. 3d 
463, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 2. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 
1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 3. See ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 119, 159 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that parties should choose governing law 
“with proper care and consideration” and describing the place of arbitration as a “decision of 
major importance”).  Of course, disputants must make other significant decisions concerning 
the scope and procedures of the arbitration. See generally Jorge L. Contreras & David L. 
Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 
2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 23 (discussing choices for the scope and proceedings of a FRAND 
arbitration). 
 4. 166 F. Supp. 3d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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I.  ARBITRATION WITHOUT LAW 
InterDigital owned several patents covering technical standards for 3G 
and 4G wireless technology, and had committed to license these patents 
under “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms.5  
Companies often dispute what constitutes “reasonable” compensation, and 
InterDigital spent a number of years in litigation with Huawei over the 
meaning of these FRAND commitments.  The dispute with Huawei 
involved actions in China, an antitrust complaint before the European 
Commission, hearings before the U.S. International Trade Commission, and 
suits in the District of Delaware.6  Eventually, in December 2013, the 
parties signed an arbitration agreement, which provided that these disputes 
would be submitted to arbitration before the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC).7 
In a relatively common move, the arbitration agreement cleaved the 
governing law of the arbitration from the situs of the arbitration 
proceeding.8  The arbitration was to take place in Paris, the headquarters of 
the ICC.9  The arbitration agreement itself, however, was governed by New 
York law, and further provided that disputes that were not within the scope 
of arbitration could be brought before “state and federal courts in the State 
of New York.”10  Unusually, the arbitration agreement expressly provided 
that no specific law would govern the question at the heart of the 
arbitration—the parties were allowed to “cite law from any jurisdiction” in 
arguing what patent license terms would constitute “fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory” compensation.11  In other words, the arbitration 
agreement provided the arbitrators with no standard or rules for determining 
what constituted FRAND licensing terms.12 
The arbitral panel rendered an award in May 2015, which included a 
determination of the terms of a patent license agreement.13  Huawei, 
unhappy with the decision, filed a motion for vacatur before the Paris 
 
 5. Id. at 466. 
 6. See InterDigital, Inc., Quarterly Report 8–16 (Form 10-Q) (May 1, 2014) (describing 
the various proceedings between InterDigital and Huawei). 
 7. See InterDigital, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 467.  Pursuant to the settlement agreement, 
InterDigital retained the right to appeal a Chinese court decision. See InterDigital, Inc. 
Quarterly Report, supra note 6, at 10. 
 8. See InterDigital, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 467–68. 
 9. See id. at 467. 
 10. Id. at 468. 
 11. Id. 
 12. In other situations where the disputants to an international arbitration have not 
specified any national law to resolve the dispute, but rather stated that arbitrators may issue a 
decision under a nonnational standard, arbitrators sometimes have employed a conflict of 
laws analysis to determine applicable national law or have determined that they are 
empowered to make an award based on “general principles of law,” occasionally referred to 
as a “lex mercatoria.” See David W. Rivkin, Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on 
Lex Mercatoria, 9 ARB. INT’L 67, 68–69 (1993); see also Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in 
an International Commercial Arbitration:  Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT’L 
LAW. 613, 623–35 (1982). 
 13. See InterDigital, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 466. 
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courts.14  InterDigital countered with a petition in the Southern District of 
New York to confirm and enforce the award, pointing to the provision of 
the agreement that granted jurisdiction to the New York courts.  The 
Southern District of New York was called upon to decide whether the 
enforcement proceeding should be stayed pending the outcome of the 
proceeding in Paris. 
The district court, spotlighting the failure of the arbitration agreement to 
specify substantive law for the central question of the dispute, stayed 
InterDigital’s enforcement petition.15  The decision relied on the court’s 
interpretation of the New York Convention, a widely adopted convention 
that governs the enforcement of international arbitral awards.16  The court 
noted that the New York Convention divides jurisdictions into “primary” 
and “secondary” jurisdictions.17  A court has “primary jurisdiction” if it is 
in “the country in which, or under the [arbitration] law of which, [an] award 
was made.”18  Such courts have broad discretion to set aside arbitral 
decisions.  In contrast, a court with “secondary jurisdiction” may only 
decline to enforce an award for a limited set of enumerated reasons.19  The 
InterDigital court reasoned that it had only secondary jurisdiction—the 
situs of the arbitration was in France and, even though the arbitration 
agreement was governed by New York law, the parties did not specify any 
governing law for the key issue of what constituted FRAND licensing 
terms.20  In other words, New York was neither the law of the country “in 
which” the arbitration took place, nor did it provide the law “under” which 
the award was made.  Given that New York had only secondary jurisdiction 
under the New York Convention, the court exercised its discretion to stay 
InterDigital’s enforcement action.21  Unfortunately, while InterDigital 
seems to follow closely the New York Convention, it in fact seriously 
misinterprets the treaty.  Moreover, such misinterpretation could undercut 
the sometimes important strategy of agreeing to resolve disputes through 
arbitration, despite disagreement concerning the law applicable to the 
dispute. 
II.  WHAT LAW FOR FRAND? 
InterDigital involved FRAND claims—a dispute over InterDigital’s 
commitment to license patents under “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” conditions.22  InterDigital made this commitment when it 
participated in setting the technical standards for 3G and 4G wireless 
 
 14. See id. at 468. 
 15. See id. at 473. 
 16. See id. at 470; see also New York Convention, supra note 2. 
 17. InterDigital, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 469. 
 18. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 469–70, 472 n.3. 
 22. Id. at 466. 
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technology, and provided the standard-setting body with patented 
technology that became “essential” to those standards.23  Participants in the 
standard-setting process are typically required by standards organizations to 
commit to licensing their “standard-essential patents” on FRAND terms.24  
FRAND commitments encourage adoption of the standard by providing 
assurance that proprietary technology in the standard will be available for 
licensing on reasonable terms. 
The FRAND standard, however, can often seem vague and ambiguous, 
and disputes arise when firms cannot reach an agreement on what 
constitutes FRAND licensing terms.25  Scholars have long disputed the 
mechanics for calculating a FRAND royalty,26 and only a limited number 
of judicial decisions address the matter.27  Moreover, different jurisdictions 
can view FRAND commitments from starkly diverging perspectives.  Some 
jurisdictions may be solicitous of the rights of patent holders, while others 
may require patent holders to license their technologies for only minimal 
compensation.  Indeed, the InterDigital parties had previously jousted in 
China, where a court set a FRAND rate that some American scholars 
believed was “orders of magnitude lower” than ordinary industry 
demands.28  In other words, what constitutes a FRAND royalty can be 
characterized by acute legal uncertainty, and this uncertainty is only 
magnified when the disputing parties come from jurisdictions with different 
ideas about how to compensate owners of intellectual property rights. 
These acute differences explain InterDigital and Huawei’s unorthodox 
choice to resolve their FRAND dispute through arbitration, while also 
 
 23. See Certain Wireless Devices with 3G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. 
No. 337-TA-800, slip op. at 418–22 (ALJ June 28, 2013) (Initial Determination). 
 24. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable 
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1136 (2013). 
 25. Most standard-setting organizations disclaim any role in determining the details of a 
FRAND license. See id. at 1137–38 (2013) (arguing that litigation over FRAND royalties 
demonstrates the “ambiguities and omissions in the FRAND system”); see also Mark A. 
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1889, 1906 (2002). 
 26. Compare Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1991 (2007) (proposing methodologies for calculation of FRAND rates), 
with Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third-Party 
Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 923–27 (2014) (criticizing 
the methodology proposed by Lemley & Shapiro). 
 27. In December 2013, when the InterDigital arbitration agreement was signed, only two 
U.S. courts had addressed the calculation of FRAND rates. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); 
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013). 
 28. Leon B. Greenfield et al., SEP Enforcement Disputes Beyond the Water’s Edge:  A 
Survey of Recent Non-U.S. Decisions, 27 ANTITRUST 50, 53 (2013).  The Chinese decision 
also took into account factors that U.S. courts would not have considered, and may have 
been influenced by government pressure. See D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND 
in China, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71, 90 (2013). 
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declining to specify the national law applicable to the dispute.29  A growing 
consensus of scholars and regulators regard arbitration as an efficient means 
of resolving FRAND disputes.30  These advocates assert that arbitration 
results in substantial cost savings when compared to the cost of litigating 
complex patent disputes across several jurisdictions.  At the same time, 
given the potential stark differences between royalty rates set by differing 
jurisdictions (e.g., the expected divergence between the royalty rates in 
Chinese and U.S. courts in the InterDigital litigation), parties may not be 
able to agree on an appropriate governing law.  While not specifying 
applicable law can increase legal uncertainty,31 this may be less relevant to 
disputes (such as FRAND) where the appropriate resolution requires 
empirical comparison to, and detailed economic analysis of, similar 
licensing agreements.32  Here, the parties may have decided that the costs of 
failing to agree on governing law were not high in a dispute focused on 
such specific economic terms and where the substantive law of no 
jurisdiction could provide clear legal guidance as to the details of such 
terms. 
 
 29. The InterDigital arbitration involved technical standards administered by at least 
three standards organizations—the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI), the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA), and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). See Certain Wireless Devices with 3G Capabilities and 
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-800, slip op. at 418–19 (ALJ June 28, 2013) (Initial 
Determination).  The FRAND commitment to ETSI expressly provided that it would be 
governed by French law. See id. at 422.  In contrast, the Chinese decision setting FRAND 
rates asserted that the dispute should be governed by Chinese law. See Sokol & Zheng, 
supra note 28, at 90; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing generally the 
Chinese decision).  The policies of the TIA and ITU do not specify any governing law. See 
TIA, TIA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY (IPR POLICY) (1st ed. 2014), 
http://www.tiaonline.org/sites/default/files/pages/IPRP-2014May01_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WZZ2-73T9]; Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, ITU, http://www.itu.int/ 
en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RDD9-
STQH]. 
 30. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 24; Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting 
Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 1, 4. 
 31. See Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1819 (1988) (asserting that when parties specify arbitration by general 
principles of law, the “results become unpredictable, and parties to agreements have little 
ground on which to base their expectations”); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting 
out of National Law:  An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 523, 533 (2005) (asserting that “contractual choice of law avoids uncertainty”). 
 32. Both Chinese and American approaches to determining FRAND rates rely on 
comparisons to similar licensing agreements.  U.S. courts typically use a list of fifteen so-
called Georgia-Pacific factors to determine royalty rates for patented technology. Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Lemley, 
supra note 25, at 1914 n.84 (stating that “the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors have become a 
standard measure of reasonable royalties in patent cases”). Factor one involves examination 
of royalties previously paid for the patent in suit and factor two involves comparison to 
licensing rates paid for comparable patents. See Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at 
*54.  For a summary of how Chinese courts have also used comparison methodologies to set 
FRAND rates, see Fei Deng & Su Sun, Determining the FRAND Rate:  U.S. Perspectives on 
Huawei v. InterDigital, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Feb. 2014, at 1. 
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III.  ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT LAW 
The New York Convention is the foundational treaty concerning 
international commercial arbitration.33  The purpose of the New York 
Convention is to ensure certainty in the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards.34  InterDigital seems at first blush to further 
these purposes—the court declines to conduct a superfluous review of the 
arbitral award and defers to the determination of the courts at the arbitration 
situs.  But InterDigital badly misinterprets the New York Convention, and 
the decision could increase concerns about the integrity and enforceability 
of international arbitration where the parties have not agreed on applicable 
governing law. 
To the extent arbitrating parties have concerns about the integrity of the 
arbitral process, InterDigital magnifies those concerns by implying that 
disputants that forgo specific national law have limited their rights to 
judicial review of the arbitral decision.  As per InterDigital, New York 
courts cannot review arbitral awards that are not made under New York 
substantive law, and as such the Southern District of New York could not 
review the FRAND award made under general principles of law.35  This, 
however, represents a misunderstanding of the New York Convention.  The 
New York Convention indeed allows for judicial review of arbitral 
decisions by the jurisdiction “under the law of which” the decision was 
made, but this refers to the procedural law of the arbitration situs rather than 
the substantive law governing the dispute.36  In other words, the choice of 
substantive law does not affect the parties’ rights to judicial review under 
the New York Convention, and the court’s power to review the award 
would have been limited even if the parties had specified that the arbitration 
would be governed by New York substantive law.  Nevertheless, 
 
 33. See REDFERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 69 (characterizing the New York Convention 
as “the most important international treaty relating to international commercial arbitration” 
and a “major factor in the development of arbitration” as a means of international dispute 
resolution). 
 34. See generally New York Convention, supra note 2. 
 35. See InterDigital Commc’ns, Inc. v. Huawei Inv. & Holding Co., 166 F. Supp. 3d 
463, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 36. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 289–90 (5th Cir. 2004); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co.,, 
87 F.3d 844, 848 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Steel Corp. of the Phil. v. Int’l Steel Servs., Inc., 
354 F. App’x 689, 693 (3d Cir. 2009).  The arbitration agreement at issue in InterDigital was 
governed by New York law. InterDigital, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 468.  Unless arbitration 
agreements expressly specify otherwise, however, courts will ordinarily interpret such 
provisions as referring to the substantive law governing the contract rather than the 
procedural law governing the international arbitration. See Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 290.  
The rules governing the interpretation of agreements for domestic arbitration may be 
somewhat muddier. Compare Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 
64 (1995) (holding that an agreement specifying New York law refers to “substantive 
principles that New York courts would apply, but not to include special rules limiting the 
authority of arbitrators”), with Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470, 479 (1989) (finding that a contract containing a choice of 
law provision incorporated the California rules of arbitration). 
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InterDigital incorrectly states that the parties’ decision to not specify 
governing law—a decision without which they may have found insufficient 
common ground to agree to arbitration—results in a waiver of their right to 
judicial review of the arbitral award. 
Second, for parties concerned about the possibility of enforcing arbitral 
determinations, InterDigital’s misinterpretation suggests that awards under 
substantive general principles of law may be treated differently under the 
New York Convention, as opposed to awards made under national law.  
This suggestion resurrects old debates over whether courts will enforce 
arbitral decisions not made under specific national law.  Early English 
courts and commentators voiced a traditional hostility toward arbitration 
agreements not governed by the law of a specific jurisdiction, such as 
agreements to arbitrate under general principles of law or equity.37  Later 
judicial decisions evolved toward the enforcement of such arbitral 
decisions.38  In Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould 
Inc.,39 for example, the defendant, Gould, resisted the enforcement of an 
award made by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.40  Gould pointed to 
the same language cited by InterDigital, arguing that article V(1)(e) of the 
New York Convention refers to the enforcement of arbitral decisions made 
“under the law” of a country and thus did not include the enforcement of 
decisions not made under national law.41  The Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument, holding that courts had jurisdiction to enforce arbitral awards 
regardless of whether they were made under the law of a state.42  Gould’s 
discredited arguments, however, live on in InterDigital, which also reads 
out nonnational substantive law from article V(1)(e) of the New York 
Convention.43 
CONCLUSION 
Most contracting parties prefer to have their agreement governed by a 
specific national law, and it is rare for parties to stipulate that nonnational 
legal principles will govern their relationship.44  International FRAND 
disputes, however, may present a situation that calls for the application of 
such “general principles of law.”  Scholars have disparaged nonnational law 
as frequently vague and as not providing sufficient clarity or certainty for 
 
 37. See Rivkin, supra note 12, at 73. 
 38. See id. at 74. 
 39. 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 40. See id. at 1358. 
 41. See id. at 1364. 
 42. See id. at 1365. 
 43. In a similar vein, some commentators have asserted that the phrase “under the law of 
which,” in referring to the procedural law of the arbitration, means the New York 
Convention should only apply to awards made under the procedural safeguards of another 
contracting party, and should not apply to arbitrations not subject to any national procedural 
law. See Rivkin, supra note 12, at 80–81. 
 44. See Drahozal, supra note 31, at 549 (“The available empirical evidence indicates 
that parties only rarely contract for application of transnational commercial law.”). 
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international legal disputes.45  At the same time, however, national courts 
have issued few FRAND decisions, making it unapparent whether national 
law provides a clear basis for determining “fair and reasonable” royalty 
rates.  Moreover, determinations of FRAND can be technocratic exercises 
of comparing similar licensing transactions,46 and the substantive 
foundations of national law may not be necessary to support such economic 
assessments.  As such, given the difficulty of agreeing on a body of national 
law to govern FRAND disputes, some parties may find it appropriate to 
escape the system of national laws altogether. 
Given their heterogeneous membership and diverse interests, standards 
organizations have found it difficult to agree on detailed standards and 
procedures for determining FRAND licensing terms.47  It is unlikely that 
disputing parties, having failed to find common ground during the 
collaborative standards process, will suddenly discover consensus during a 
contentious arbitral proceeding.48  As such, parties to an international 
FRAND arbitration may often find it productive to avoid the question of 
governing law by making reference to neutral nonnational standards.  In 
misinterpreting the New York Convention, however, InterDigital may 
make it less likely that parties will agree to use such neutral general 
principles for an arbitral proceeding.  Specifying governing law may not 
always provide clarity and efficiency for dispute resolution, but InterDigital 
may raise the costs of failing to find agreement on such matters. 
 
 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 546. 
 46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Geradin, supra note 26, at 932–33; see also Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, 
and Antitrust:  Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 791, 806 (2014) (stating that standards organizations “typically specify very little as to 
the meaning of ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable,’ at least in part because there is significant 
heterogeneity among the firms, technologies, and products”). 
 48. Eli Greenbaum, Forgetting FRAND:  The WIPO Model Submission Agreement, LES 
NOUVELLES, July 2015, at 81, 86. 
